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SONG OF SIXPENCE
SOME COMMENTS ON WILLIAMS v. NORTH'CAROLINA
JOSEPH WALTER BINGHAM

I have been requested by the editor of the QUARTERLY to comment on the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and the opinions of
the justices in the recent case of Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287,
63 Sup. Ct. 2d7 (1942). In answer to the first invitation of the editor,
which reached me before I had seen a full report of the case, I replied
that if published summaries were correct, there was no important new
development involved in the decision. Indeed, on this assumption, no other
decision was possible without a revolutionary departure from fundamental
traditional postulates of our constitutional law. I attributed the editorial
comment in the public press to laymen's mistaken notions of the meaning
of the decision. The editor replied that the case had aroused great interest
in professional circles and was considered an incident of epochal significance
by many. It was suggested that it might be interesting to have a consideration of the case against the background of my article of 1936 [The American
Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court-In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock (1936) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 393] in which I protested the solution of
the problem of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906),
suggested by the late Professor Joseph H. Beale of the Harvard Law School
and backed by the potent prestige and propaganda of the American Law
Institute. The editor also sent me advance sheets containing the report of
the case which I had not found available in the wartime remote and fabulous
province of my habitat.
The opinions in the case and the professional comment in reviews renewed my surprise at the chaos of floundering technic still characteristic
of this field of divorce jurisdiction and convinced me that probably some
further stones cast by me at least might enliven the mental riot. Hence this
article in which I shall comment briefly not only on Williams v. North
Carolina,but also on another case, Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct.
3 (1939), which likewise has been a subject of bewildered discussion.
I do not purpose to explain again my views on the general problem of jurisdiction to divorce or my interpretation of the decision in Haddock v. Had-
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dock. For convenience let us incorporate by reference my article of 1936
[The American Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court-In the Matter of
Haddock v. Haddock (1936) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 393]. My present comments
on Willians v. North Carolina and Davis v. Davis are a postscript to that
article and should be read against the background of knowledge of its thesis.
I shall base my discussion of Williams v. North Carolina on the assumption that the record in the case justified the summary of points of fact on
which Justice Douglas founded his decision. I do not intend to consult
the record myself, for I am concerned with the case principally in its aspect
as a precedent and its influence as such will be circumscribed by the estimate
of essential facts in the opinions.
We shall assume then that the relevant facts of Williams v. North Carolina were as follows:
Mr. and Mrs. Williams and Mr. and Mrs. Hendrix all were domiciled in
North Carolina where each couple had been married and had lived together for many years. Through one of those developments of temperament, environment, and human impulse which so often in this land of
individual initiative and the profit motive disrupt the regimented arrangements of our social life, Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix decided that they
must leave their respective spouses and live together as husband and wife.
Since the legal facilities of North Carolina were not adapted to speedy
accomplishment of their purposes, they left for the more accommnodating
environment of Nevada. After residence in an automobile camp for the
short period of legal domicil (six weeks) required by the genial laws of'
Nevada, each of our truant lovers obtained a divorce decree on the ground
of extreme cruelty. They thereupon promptly married in Nevada and soon
returned together to North Carolina and resumed residence in that state.
Neither of the other spouses had appeared in the divorce suit and and neither
had been subjected otherwise to the jurisdiction of the Nevada court.
As occasionally happens in such cases, the law enforcement officials of
North Carolina decided that a violation of the criminal statutes of the state
was involved in this sequence of events and hence our two lovers were
prosecuted for bigamous cohabitation'committed in North Carolina. At the
trial the question of innocence or guilt turned on the validity of the Nevada
divorces and marriage. The judge charged the jury in substance that the
Nevada divorce decrees were not valid in North Carolina. He also charged
on the state's contention that the defendants went to Nevada, not to establish bona fide residences but solely to obtain divorces through fraud on the
court, that the burden of proof of the bona fides of their residences in

1943]

WILLIAMS v. NORTH CAROLINA

Nevada was on the defendants. The defendants were convicted and the
,conviction was sustained on appeal to the highest court of the state. The
state supreme court held that, under the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock,
North Carolina was not bound to recognize the Nevada decrees as effective
defenses. On certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States apparently counsel for the State of North Carolina, arguing the case, did not
insist on the point that defendants never acquired a domicil in Nevada, but
rather emphasized that regardless of this question North Carolina, under
the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock, was entitled to enforce the policy of
its laws against defendants by treating the Nevada divorces as legally void
in North Carolina.
Justice Douglas, in his opinion justifying the decision of the Court that
the judgment of the North Carolina courts must be reversed for violation
of the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution of the United States
and the case remanded with directions, stated that counsel for North Carolina
apparently had waived the question of bona fide Nevada domicils. He then
emphasized that at any rate domicil of the defendants in Nevada at the
time of the divorce decrees must be assumed for the purposes of the decision, since one of the charges to the jury had stated substantially that the
fact of bona fide domicil in Nevada at the time of the divorce decrees would
not g ve the divorces validity as a defense in these North Carolina proceedings and if this charge was wrong the conviction must be set aside.
Few lawyers will disagree with the Court's decision that the charge obviated all question of defendant',s domicils at the time of the divorce decrees.
Certainly in a criminal prosecution an instruction such as that in question
is of vital importance to the defense and if it was wrong the conviction
should not be sustained. Indeed it seems that the motivation of the dissents
of Justices Murphy and Jackson to the disposition of this case was superfluously expended, since clearly on a retrial on proper instructions and evidence to support sufficiently the view of the facts entertained by the dissenting justices, the defendants might well be convicted again.
Before leaving this matter of domicils of defendants at the time of the
divorce decrees, it should be noted that perhaps one important change in
law may grow out of this case. As to the male defendant's domicil, there
is no new point of law in the case; but as to the female defendant's domicil,
there is this important question. Does the Court's decision imply that if
Mrs. Hendrix intended bona fide to make Nevada her home during
her sojourn there she thereby became domiciled in Nevada regardless of
other facts? If it does, then here we have a law making precedent which
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should be marked with greater emphasis than the opinions in the case
accord it. Hitherto the Supreme Court has not conceded to a married woman
a power of changing her domicil for purposes of divorce jurisdiction unless
she was justified in separating from her husband. The traditional view is
that the domicil of a wife at fault who still is legally bound to live with
her husband, remains the same as her husband's. In my opinion this traditional view entails undesirable consequences in the law of divorce, and a
diminution in complication, uncertainty, and injustice in the law would result
if a married woman were conceded a power of changing her domicil for
purposes of jurisdiction over marital suits and decrees equivalent to that
possessed by married men. I therefore hope that this consequence will
flow from Williams v. North Carolina; but I do not think it dear that it
will, for the bare decision may be defined to mean on this point of Mrs.
Hendrix's domicil merely that all questions of disputed fact bearing 6n the
matter of her domicil should have been left to the jury under proper instructions. However, justice Douglas's language certainly lends support to the
view that he deliberately intended this important change in the law; for he
says in criticizing the novel proposal of the American Law Institute [317
U. S. at 300, 63 Sup. Ct. at 214 (1942)]:
"... And all that would flow from the legalistic notion that where
one spouse is wrongfully deserted he retains power over the matrimonial domicil so that the domicil of the other spouse follows him
wherever he may go, while, if he is to blame, he retains no such power.
But such considerations are inapposite."
Thus we whittle our case down to this abstraction. Defendants were
domiciled in Nevada at the times of their divorce decrees and subsequent
marriage. Their deserted spouses were still domiciled in North Carolina. At
the time of the prosecution defendants had returned to North Carolina
under a new change of desire as to where they wished to make their home.
May North Carolina, now the home state of all four persons involved in this
marital shuffle, punish defendants for bigamous cohabitation committed by
living together as husband and wife in North Carolina, because under North
Carolina law defendants are not divorced from their respective former
spouses? An affirmative answer to this question would be opposed to the
uniform trend of decisions of our Supreme Court as to the pertinent fundamental tenets of our constitutional law throughout its history. Always it
has been held that the capacity of a person to marry in his state of domicil
may be restored by a divorpe granted by that state regardless of its jurisdiction over the other spouse1 and never has there been any support given
'Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888).
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by the Supreme Court to the view that such a divorce was not entitled to
full faith and credit to this extent and also to the extent of freeing the
divorcee from all ties of marital intercourse to his former spouse wherever
in the United States that former spouse was domiciled. In the light of
all the precedents bearing on the point and of common sense and sound
legal policy any other decision on this question would have been revolutionary'
and astounding. Only befogged mechanical thinking can lead to disagreement with this statement. 2 Even the New York state court precedents before
Haddock v. Haddock, in harmony with the theme of the decision in that
case, clearly are in accord with the decision of the Supreme Court in Williams
v. North Carolina. The leading case opinions outlining the theory of the
New York traditional state law on the Haddock v. Haddock type of problem
did not assert that New York could refuse to recognize the effect 'of a
foreign divorce such as the Connecticut one involved in Haddock v. Haddock
in freeing the Connecticut domiciled husband from his incapacity to remarry.
2
This is not a criticism of the opinions of the dissenting justices in Williams v. North
Carolina. It is not at all applicable to. them. The motive of the opinions of Justices

.Murphy and Jackson lay in their conception of' the concrete facts of the case derived

from reading the record. Their concern was with the entire picture of the episode
revealed by the record as interpreted by them as follows: Two citizens of North

Carolina, who found its laws opposed to their desires, sought to thwart those laws, not
by leaving the state and finding a new home with a more congenial social and legal

atmosphere, but by feigning a change of state allegiance and then having secured
divorces and a marriage through the technical agency of the laws of a foreign state
of feigned domicile returning in triumph to reside in their true home state in defiance
of a fundamental policy of its society and legislation. As a lawyer, interested in orderly
organized government and respect for law determined by democratic processes, up to
the limit of such oppressive measures against liberty and justice as impel to rebellion

or evasion, I have great sympathy for the view of the dissenting justices. I also sympa-

thize with the sound tendency of all able judges to decide their cases rather on the
basis of the net impact of the facts on their sense of justice and statesmanship than on that
of mechanical barren logic and an isolated professional technic.

My disagreement with Justices Murphy and Jackson may be stated as follows. I

believe that on the record in this case of criminal prosecution for a serious offense,

every inference of fact should be strongly in favor of the accused and the decision as to
the effect of the evidence should be left to the jury-not the judge. The instruction

held erroneous by the majority of the justices took away from the jury as irrelevant
a decision on the question whether defendants did not bona fide intend to change their

homes from North Carolina to Nevada during their sojourn in Nevada-that is whether
the facts were not those assumed by Justice Douglas, i.e., that defendants had established permanent homes in Nevada before their divorces and marriage there and only
after remarriage decided to return to North Carolina.
A safeguard against that flouting of the law of North Carolina which troubled the
dissenting justices lies in the possibility of convicting the flouters by convincing the
jury against them on the evidenge and proper instructions as to the law.
After all logical legal technic is an important factor in the sound administration of
justice and our traditional safeguards for the liberties of the accused individual should
not be sacrificed to a natural desire to short-cut a path to the ultimate result which
the recorded evidence seems clearly to indicate as desirable and proper in the interests
of sound democratic government.
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Indeed these opinions imply that his foreign remarriage would be held valid
in New York as far as such a question as was involved in Williams v. North
3
Carolina is concerned.
Furthermore it is quite clear that the Supreme Court membership which
decided Haddock v. Haddock would have decided a case like Williams v.
North Carolinaon the basis of Justice Douglas's interpretation of the record,
just as the present membership decided that case, and probably would have
done so unanimously. The entire framework of Justice White's logic is
quite consistent with the disposition made of Williams v. North Carolina
and is inconsistent with a contrary disposition.
This brings me to consider the discussion of Haddock v. Haddock in the
opinion of the Court in Williams-v. North Carolina and especially the assertion that Haddock v. Haddock is overruled, for here indeed we do have a
revolutionary incident which is quite disturbing to an advocate of our traditional common law jurisprudence with its cautious technic and its constant
awareness of the essential distinction between legislation and the judicial
process. I am concerned to elaborate this point because I fear that the
opinion of the Court, however inadvertently, will accelerate a trend in our
professional thinking-especially in the thinking of some of our teachers of
law and legal philosophers and commentators-which seems to me pernicious
and symptomatic of a deterioration in professional technic and the intelligent
administration of justice.
Usually most practical case lawyers do not weigh too critically the logic
or language of judicial opinions. Realizing the pressures under which judges
work and the inherent difficulties of precise analysis and expression throughout the wide and complicated technical fields into which their labors carry
them, we old fashioned lawyers are concerned principally with the disposition
of the case on the record and the essential motivation of that disposition.
We realize that the judges' opinions are not an essential part of the case.
They are collateral explanations of their judgments addressed to the profession and important only because they satisfy a natural curiosity of counsel
and parties to know why the court has decided so and because they give
some further data for estimating future governmental actions of courts and
other agencies. In function and reliability they are somewhat analogous to
the remarks of the President at his press conferences concerning governmental acts and purposes. The remarks may. or may not be accurate in
details or illuminating or logically satisfying. Events may or may not corroborate them-may or may'not disappoint reliance on them. They them3

See footnotes and authorities -cited in my 1936 article, 21

CoRNELL L.

Q. 402-427.
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selves are not officially operative acts of government. Consequently the
trained common law investigator (like the trained newsman) always has
weighed carefully the language of the opinion against the facts of the case
and has been cautious not to give a wider scope of importance to the judges'
remarks than tle facts of the case demanded. In recent years, however,
there has been a growing tendency, formerly confined to relatively unschooled lawyers, among some teachers and commentators to treat the statements in a judicial opinion as of greater importance than the case and to treat
the case, a transient phenomenon, as of significance only as the occasion of
the opinions. Hence a growing carelessness in appreciation of the case
itself and in elaboration of the import of particular generalized postulates
in the opinions-and hence such a riot of amazing comment and speculation
as that which has appeared in our legal periodicals after Davis v. Davis and
now Williams v. North Carolinta.
A common phrase which always jars my political sensibilities because it
souinds inconsistent with our traditional democratic ideas of the function
of governmental officials in society, illustrates this tendency to promote a
judicial opinion to oracular status-"the court handed down an opinion in
Willians v. North Carolinatoday." The analogy of the Lord handing down
the two tables of stone to Moses on Mount Sinai and thence to the priesthood of Israel rises in my mind when I hear a lawyer use this phrase. It
is because, inadvertently, the dictum concerning Haddock v. Haddock lends
support to this theory of the function of a judicial opinion, that I am moved
to discuss it at some length. I hope that this will not be taken as mere
captiousness, for aside from its humorous phases, the natter is of importance
to our professional technic. Even the doubts as to the law of future cases
caused by judicial utterances which are not carefully confined to the needs of
the case in hand and professional resentments at later decisions which are
believed to be contrary to inferences drawn from those utterances are detriments worth avoiding; and unfortunately we have many in the profession
who, like Cook's tourists in foreign parts relying entirely on oracular guides
and guide books, base their legal opinions principally on abstract judicial
declarations.
I hasten to say that I agree entirely not only with the judgment of the
court in Williams v. North Carolina, bitt with the motivation of Justice
Douglas's decision as I gather it from his opinion. I even agree with the
predictions of his future decisions on other problems usually discussed
in connection with Haddock v. Haddock, so far as I can infer these predictions with reasonable certainty from his opinion. Indeed the opinion
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in the abstract compares quite favorably with other judicial opinions in
the field, as was to be expected from the excellent abilities and scholarship of the author. It happens, however, that the subject matter of the
case falls in a field unfamiliar to Justice Douglas, and indeed to almost
all judges, and also in a part of that field (judgments and jurisdiction over
marital interests) in which the opinions of some "experts" are erratically
floundering in a juridical chaos of dogmas and uncertainties. It is not surprising therefore to find a number of errors in details in this judicial opinion,
for which Justice Douglas could cite respectable "expert" authority. I do
not object to the opinion, taken by itself, but to its natural effect on lawyers,
especially those who will interest themselves in it critically and seek to
ascribe to it implications of collateral future effects. Therefore the reader
should appreciate that in the following summary criticism I am merely trying to mirror the probable effects of thle Court's opinion on the mind of the
average intelligent lawyer,, who is interested in the field of law into which
this case falls and who will endeavor to estimate the purport for future
decisions of the motivation of the judges indicated by Justice Douglas's
opinion. Later in this comment I shall give my own ifiterpretation 'of the
opinion, which may or may not be correct.
My criticism of the opinion will be confined to the following points:
(1) Whittled down to the abstract facts to which the majority justices
and we preliminarily have reduced Williams v. North Carolina, the case
could not have been decided otherwise than the Court decided it without a
revolutionary overturning of precedents and commonly accepted pertinent
principles of our constitutional law. It would have been decided the same
way by the justices who disposed of Haddock v. Haddock and the judges
who elaborated the New York doctrine which brought Haddock v. Haddock
to the Supreme Court of the United States. In fact the precise problem
presented in Haddock v. Haddock is, not presented or involved in Williams
v. North Carolina and the differing problems in the two cases include quite
'diverse social considerations of justice. It therefore seems to me to be unwise
-and indeed almost unprecedented in all the history of Anglo-American
jurisprudence-for the justices to say that "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled." There have been a few instances in our jurisprudential history where
judges have departed deliberately from their traditional cautious technic of
confining their authoritative declarations to the necessities of the case in
hand. ,Of course also judges often have announced in their opinions that
previous decisions of their court "are overruled"-thatis, have given notice
to the profession that they propose to treat these decisions as no longer
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persuasive precedents. But usually they have taken care to confine such
warnings to precedents which have so close a similarity to the case in hand
as to make the two decisions logically inconsistent. The deliberate exceptions
have been extraordinary in circumstances. For instance, one of these exceptions in the jurisprudence of my home state marked a striking departure
from a trend of many years on a basic problem of riparian rights and was
one item in a determined change in attitude and technic with respect to the
water law of the state of which the court wisely thought, it best to inform
the profes'sion. 4 We have no such revolutionary change in fundamental
judicial technic in the field of Conflict of Laws involved in our principal
case; and indeed the Court's opinion serves rather to cloud than to enlighten
the critical professional mind as to the course of future decisions on phases
of our problem collateral to the -precise question in Williams v. North
Carolina.
(2) It is this clouding of professional understanding on an important
social as well as legal problem that will prove most annoying to many of my
colleagues, and therefore I propose to take up the dubious items in brief
summary.
In the opiiion there are several mistaken statements about Haddock
(3)
v. Haddock and the law pertaining to the general field of this case which
should be mentioned. Ordinarily I do not consider it a valuable use of
time or an interesting or commendable occupation for a commentator to
criticize the minutiae of a judicial opinion. Judges are not expected to be
accurate in their general statements of law. To demand entirely sound general premises or unassailable logic from busy men in the collateral perfunctory explanations of their official acts-explanations which in themselves are
not governmental acts and have no direct practical analogous force-is futile.
In this case, however, I am concerned to point out errors in detail-not
as a criticism of the Court's argument, but because through careless repetition in these active, revolutionary, emotional and not very deeply thoughtful times, these errors of statement may ripen into very potent seeds of
future professional trouble and deterioration in technic and justice. The
majority of the present members of the Court has been responsible for a
revolutionary change in the course of decisions in the field of Conflict of
Laws which threatens havoc to the previous long laborious trend towards
coherence, certainty, and uniformity, which entails consequences that do
not appeal to the practical views of justice of the majority of the members
4
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. (2d) 351, 40 P. (2d) 486 (1935). Bingham,
Some Suggestions Cotwerning the California Law of Riparian Rights (1934) 22 CALIF.
L. REv. 251, LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORIx Kip McMuRRAY (1935) 7.
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of the profession who are interested in the matter, which was founded
entirely on an academic, doctrinaire premise and supported by a mechanical
logic, and which, I believe, ultimately will result in a technical muddle from
which the Court can extricate itself only by another revolution in fundamental premises. 5 I am interested in opposing a similar development in this
5
0One of the most startling changes of a fundamental rule of decisions which the
Supreme Court of the United States ever has made was that involved in Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1
(U. S. 1842). This is so because the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was not an anachronistic doctrine of federal constitutional law, but one of construction of a federal statute
in accordance with a policy of juridical expediency and because that construction had
persisted through frequent decisions for almost a hundred years, although vigorous protests against the policy had been uttered in dissenting opinions of distinguished members
of the Court many times. I believe that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins was wisely decided
for the reasons of expediency mentioned in the able opinion of Justice Brandeis. Indeed
I had predicted such a decision to my classes with confidence for many years before
itoccurred.
Nevertheless I cannot agree to certain familiar artificial doctrines cpncerning the
nature of state common law and the true oracles of its determination which have enshrouded the controversy over Swift v. Tyson and slightly tinged the opinion of Justice
Brandeis. These doctrines have threatened to destroy all appreciation of the live body
of the problem which is that complex of historical fact and ,consideration of juridical
policy so excellently summarized by Justice Brandeis. Furthermore, I do not believe
that any case is made against the original propriety of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
by announcement of a principle that the same justice should be afforded suitors in the
federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases as they would obtain in the courts of
the state in whose territory the federal court is sitting. (Of course the purpose of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was to insure the contrary in some cases.) After all
the state territory is federal government territory also-part of the territory of the
United States in which the federal government operates and the federal courts sit under
federal authority under the Constitution as domestic and not foreign and not subordinate
agencies. It is true that there should be the same justice in substance obtainable from
either state or federal court, so far as practicable. This is sound jurisprudence. A
similar foundation tenet runs throughout the field of Conflict of Laws. But thus far
the argument does not establish that the desired uniformity should be obtained by the
federal courts following the lead of the state courts rather than by the state courts
following the lead of the federal courts on common law points. Indeed the purpose of
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was to carry through this sound foundation tenet of
"Conflicts" jurisprudence over a wider range than is covered by the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins. It was a noble experiment, similar in motive to that of the American
Law Institute, which failed for the reasons of human nature set forth in the Court's
opinion in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. If the experiment had succeeded, there could
have been no sound objection to the doctrine. The'only reasonable argument against
the doctrine is that events had established that its purpose could not be accomplished
and its effects were practically pernicious.
Certainly the doctrine was not unconstitutional, although the legitimate policies of
state governments with respect to local affairs were in many cases thwarted or embarrassed by designing use of it by private persons. It is difficult to find any other
sensible meaning than this for the dictum of Justice Holmes that the doctrine offended
against the Constitution or for the similar, but not so vigorous assertion of Justice
Brandeis. Furthermore, the arguments against this phase of the opinion of Justice
Brandeis in the dissenting opinion of Justice Butler and in the concurring opinion of
Justice Reed seem to me convincing.
In effect Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins expediently changed the interpretation of the
Judiciary Act and that. is all. The catastrophic trend to which I refer in the text of
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field of divorce jurisdiction. I do not believe that the present justices would
this article, supra, came later when the Supreme Court "extending" the doctrine of
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins beyond the perfectly sound expedient of Mahomet going to
the mountain because the mountain would not come to Mahomet on the matter of
determination of state %commonlaw (whether the common law of the state in whose
territory the federal court was sitting or the common law of some other of the United
States was involved), directed abdication of the authority of a federal court to determine substantive common law independently in diversity of citizenship cases and, no
matter where the facts of the case arose, compelled instead submission to the dictation
of precedents of the courts of the state in whose territory (under federal statutory
direction) the nisi-prius federal court happens to be sitting. Especially unfortunate was
this strange extension of doctrine in matters within the field of Conflict of Laws, since
the federal courts had accomplished a great deal for uniformity of doctrine tl~rough
persuasive guidance of state courts away from unenlightened provincialism into desirable
paths of decision through the complicated jurisprudential and technical mazes of Conflicts problems. Indeed in later years there had been a gradual enlargement of the
part of this field brought into the province of federal constitutional law by court decision and it was the hope of students of the subject that as a consequence of these
beneficent trends much of the unfortunate aberration of court decisions on choice of
law ultimately might be eliminated. Now some of the gains are thrown to the winds
and in addition apparently we are in for an extended series of puzzles with complicating
solutions as to when in this field Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins does apply and when it
does not. Furthermore, there has been created the unjust situation that on a wholly
Maine transaction, a Maine plaintiff whose only chance of service of summons on his
adversary is in Massachusetts, sometimes cannot get a fair decision according to Maine
law either in a Massachusetts state court or in a federal court sitting in Massachusetts
although one naturally would think that assurance of the application of Maine law to
such a case would be a practical jurisprudential advantage of the availability of the
federal court in Massachusetts and some justification of the diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction.
See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), cert. den. 310 U. S.
650, 60 Sup. Ct. 1099 (1940) ; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487,
61 Sup. Ct. 1020 (1941) ; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023 (1941).
The decision and opinion in this last case adds other disturbing indications of deteriorating technic in the field of Conflict of Laws.
Not the least astounding feature of this mechanical "extension" of the doctrine of
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is its sabotaging of that doctrine itself, which apparently
the justices of the Supreme Court have not yet perceived. In Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins
the Court held that the federal court sitting in New York on a case which factually
was wholly a Pennsylvania case, must determine the substantive common law of the
case in accordance with Pennsylvania state court decisions. The "extension" of the
doctrine now has prescribed that the federal court sitting in New York must follow
New York state court decisions as to the' substantive common law applicable to
such a Pennsylvania case (i.e., must decide the common law points as the New York
state courts would decide them if it was sitting on the same case) although Pennsylvania state court decisions are contra. See the cases cited, supra; Slaton v. Hall,
168 Ga. 710, 148 S. E. 741 (1929) ; Nathan v. Lee, 152 Ind. 232, 52 N. E. 987 (1899) ;
Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199 (1880) ; St. Nicholas Bank v. State National Bank, 128
N. Y. 26, 27 N. E. 849 (1891).
Thus the sound practical considerations of Justice Brandeis's opinion in Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins become in large part inapplicable and there is substituted a purely academic, dogmatic premise of mechanical jurisprudence which militates to -some extent
against obliteration of the evil of private use of the diversity of law in two jurisdictions
to thwart the legitimate polices of the state in whose territory the facts of the case
arose-that evil consequence of Swift v. Tyson which impressed Justice Brandeis's
judicial sense and also that of Justice Holmes.
The Supreme Court apparently has abandoned the authority of the federal courts
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design any such disastrous result in this field; but the growing potency
of judicial utterances independent of their soundness, the chaotic arguments of commentators, the possibilities of frequent changes in the composition of the Court, and the rarity of judicial expertness in the field
of Conflict of Laws convince me that this unconventional criticism Of incidental details of a judicial opinion should not be avoided.
Let us examine then some of the dubious possible inferences from the
Court's criticism and denunciation of Haddock v.Haddock.
(1) If the essential facts all are found in favor of defendants in Willialis
v. North Carolinaw, the defendants have been validly divotced and remarried
under Nevada law and because of the potency of the Full Faith and Credit
clause of the Federal Constitution, under North Carolina law also: 6 This
is the effect of the decision of the case and accords with the precedents and
pertinent. principles of our previous jurisprudence. But how about the deserted North Carolina spouses? Suppose that they also should remarry in
North Carolina and then should be prosecuted and convicted of bigamy in
the North Carolina courts. Would such a conviction be unconstitutional?
As I understand the previous precedents bearing on this problem their
answer clearly is "no." The traditional view is that the marital capacity of
these North Carolina domiciliaries under the stated facts is a matter of
North Carolina policy and legal power. Of course under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, North Carolina could not refuse
these persons marital capacity out of pure caprice nor without sufficient
reasons of governmental policy; but in our juridical tradition we have had
some severe restrictions on remarriage of divorcees and there are still
to prevent this evil in diversity of citizenship cases before these courts by submitting
them to aberrant precedents of the courts of the state in whose territory the federal
court happens to be sitting. When this misfortune becomes evident in a striking case,
the Supreme Court may invent a new technical artifice of distinction to take it out of
the "extension" doctrine; but this would be one of those irritating complexities which
already are beginning to grow out of that doctrine and ultimately will damn it.
Of course, if the overriding, practical motive of the out-of-bounds extension of Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is opposition to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, in accordance
with a growing propaganda of late years in legal periodicals, my argument has missed
the bull's eye. If this is the case let us at once unite to get rid of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction by act of Congress before this new doctrine breeds more professional
troubles than Swift v. Tyson.
The new doctrine has caused professional consternation, for reasons similar to those
which
influence my judgment, as far south as the Argentine.
6
Would the decision in Williams v. North Carolina have been different if defendants
had married in North Carolina instead of*Nevada after their valid Nevada divorces had
been obtained? I believe that the decision should not have been different and I infer
from the Court's opinion that its decision would have accorded with this answer; but
I am not certain of this and the previous authorities leave the question in considerable
doubt.
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potent religious prejudices operative in this field which our courts have not
yet seen fit to condemn as insufficient bases for legislative restrictions., If
North Carolina should pass a law making a divorcee domiciled in North
Carolina (or such a divorcee against whom the divorce has been granted)
guilty of bigamy for remarrying in North Carolina, does the Supreme Court
now propose to hold that law'v unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment? If not, how logically could it hold a conviction of defendants in our
hypothetical case under the existing North Carolina statutes unconstitutional?
Does the Supreme Court intend a partial return to a primitive legal technic
under which the precise rubric, incantation, and routine apart from practical7
substance and effect was a distinct essence of the administration of justice ?
Certainly we have supposed hitherto that in general the Constitution does
not prohibit a state from moulding its law by judicial decision of particular
cases as effectively as through the dictates of formal legislation, and certainly words are only words and in a piece of legislation may be given by'
jtidicial decision what legal effect the courts of the state deem appropriate.
Legal fictions have played a potent part in technic, often with good effects
on the law. They still are widely used by judges. Why should not the fiction
(if it helps the argument to deem it such) of continued marriage of a
foreign divorcee to his domiciliary former spouse be used to carry out the
policies of the forum within its constitutional powers?
(2) And then we have such a problem as that involved in Haddock v.
Haddock. Does the Court's dictum mean that, under the Federal Constitution
the state of a deserted wife's domicil annot protect her economic interests
in the marriage against the effect of a foreign divorce granted the husband
by his new state of domicil when she did not appear and was not otherwise subjected personally to the jurisdiction of the foreign state and its
court? This would be indeed a startling change in our constitutional law
and a very undesirable one; for our American judges, as well as our social
workers, long have appreciated sympathetically the plight of deserted wives,
including the frequent impossibility of adequate defense of their interests
in the foreign courts of the wayward husband's state of new domicil. Or
would the Court concede the heavy arguments of justice in favor of the
deserted wife, but insist, in the interest of a primitive formalism, that her
state of domicil must afford its protection through properly worded legislation framed for that end and cannot do so as a matter of common law
7
But see my further comment, post, on the variations of this general problem of
governmental control over the marital capacity of domiciliaries against whom a valid
decree of dissolution of marriage has been issued by a foreign state.
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decision limiting (through a legal fiction, if your please) the "divorcing"
effect of the foreign decree?
(3) Justice Douglas does suggest that perhaps some limitation may be
put by the state of the deserted spouse's domicil on the effect of the foreign
divorce as to property subject to its jurisdiction [Footnote 4, 317 U. S. at
293, 63 Sup. Ct. at 210 (1942)]; but why confine this limiting power to
property interests? Why not extend it to the obligation to support the
deserted wife, which- has been a matter of more important social concern
than marital property since laborers who desert their wives and migrate
often have no property?
In the appreciation of the meaning and- motive of the decision in Haddock
v. Haddock it should be remembered that Justice White's opinion strikingly
emphasized that the particular interest involved in that case was a personal
obligation only, although it arose out of a marital status and was founded
thereon. This has troubled many undiscriminating critics of Haddock v.
Haddock, but it should not have done so. They have jumped to the conclusion that Justice White believed that divorce suits were suits in personam
and not quasi-in-rem and they have taken exception to this idea. It seems
to me that this interpretation is an injustice to White. He'would have conceded that a suit for a decree of dissolution of marriage is a suit quasi-in-rem
in that it concerns a definite legal res and, although it is not a suit directed
against the world at large, it does seek to terminate the essence of that res
with effects good not merely against the other spouse. [See, for instance,
his opinion in Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1903),
as well as his summary of postulates in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. at
566-572, 26 Sup. Ct. at 526-528 (1906).] Indeed the traditional jurisdictional requirements for suits for dissolution of marriage are not like those
for suits strictly in personain, but are like those for suits quasi-in-rem as
Justice White implies in his summary of precedents in Haddock v. Haddock.
Furthermore, historically and under Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup.
Ct. 723 (1888), a divorce decree is not necessarily a judicial act. It may
be a legislative act and need not be founded on judicial process. All this
seems to me'admitted in Justice White's opinion.
However, Justice White did hold that as far as a marital suit sought to
terminate the legal obligation of one spouse to support the other, it concerned a personal obligation and therefore was strictly in personam. Consequenftly to give a foreign decree compulsive force in such a suit under the
Full Faith and Credit clause, the foreign state must have had personal
jurisdiction over defendant at the time of the decree.8
8

See

RESTATEMENT,

CoNFLIcr oF LAWS (1934)

§ 116, Comment c: "The decree for
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Hence Justice White's emphasis on Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878),
as an authority. Pennoyer v. Neff is not a precedent on divorce jurisdiction,
but it is a leading case on jurisdiction in personam and on the technical
distinction between procedure in personam and procedure quasi-in-rein. Similarly it is to be noted that Haddock v. Haddock has been cited as a precedent
both by Justice White and by Justice Hughes in later cases which had nothing to do with marital relations or divorce or procedure quasi-in-rem but
which did concern strictly personal obligations and judgments in personam
thereon.9
The arguments of men in controversies involving their emotional prejudices always are interesting to a student of society. The tendency to lose
the balance of careful judicial appreciation of the opposing point of view,
to become irritated by its persuasive features and driven to primitive, childlike false assertions of the opposing motivation, to twist the opposing argument into an absurd array of mechanical premises and deductions, to seize
upon words and phrases and read into them something not intended, to
ignore patent elements of common sense in the criticized position ,or to embroider them with invented nonsense so as to discredit them-these have
been common features of religious and political controversies involving
strong personal or group emotional prejudices. We see instances of such
primitive technic in our current bitter political arguments-especially concerning social and commercial reforms-in the attribution of utterly absurd
motives and purposes to the President and his administration not only without evidence to support the charges but even against patent facts. [See
footnote 21 to my 1936 article, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 405-407.]
The governmental and legal problems of marital cases have been affected
similarly by emotional prejudices, some of them deep traditions of our
social history, and our law and our legal arguments sometimes have been
affected accordingly. Even within the formal decorum of judicial argument
and unofficial professional commentary the tendency to depreciate and dilute
with fiction the opposing position has been evident. A similar effect has
been produced by other critics through simple ineptitude and carelessness.
Thus Justice White, his concurring colleagues, and judges of the highest
court of the State of New York have been accused of the following proalimony being the means of enforcing the purely personal duty of the spouse, there must
either be jurisdiction over the person or jurisdiction over a thing to apply it to the
payment of a claim for alimony." (Italics added.) See also my comment, post, on
Davis v. Davis.
9
See Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 194, 35 Sup.
Ct. 579, 580 (1915) (fo6tnote) ; Spokane Inland R.R. v. Whitley, 237 U. S. 487, 496,
35 Sup. Ct. 655, 657 (1915).
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fessional views concerning Haddock v. Haddock and collateral legal phases
of the Haddock v. Haddock type of facts:
1. That Connecticut had power by a divorce decree to restore capacity
to its domiciliary, the husband, to marry in Connecticut, but that New York
is not bound to recognize this restored capacity.
2. That Connecticut had power to validate a new marriage of its divorced
domiciliary and thus raise a.legal obligation of cohabitation between these
spouses, but that this obligation need not be recognized by New York
or any other state than" Connecticut.
3. That consequently New York could insist on a continuing legal obligation of cohabitation of the divorced husband with the former New York
domiciled wife and that the man had two wives in the cohabitation senseone under New York law and another under Connecticut law."
Now, of course, any constitutional lawyer who would propose such a solution of our marital and divorce jurisdictional problems under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit clause should at once be classified
as a professional and political incompetent-indeed a logical jackass-and
this idea clearly is implied although decorously camouflaged in the prevalent
criticism of Haddock v. Haddock. But a reasonable measure of Christian
charity should prevent the attribution of such views to an opponent without
conclusive evidence that he entertained them. Every presumption should be
indulged that his language, however unclear it may be, or however his
logical expression may falter at points, means something more sensible.
Especially should this be done with respect to a lawyer as distinguished and
as carefully-even laboriously-logical and orthodox and religious as Justice
White. However one may differ with some of his judicial decisions, one
should concede that he was a man of too much professional ability and
learning to be guilty of the absurd views attributed to him by the ardent
critics of Haddock v. Haddock. I am sure that every present member of
the Supreme Court of the United States will agree with me in these statements and that each of them would resent any suggestion that he shares the
careless prevalent opinion of the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock or would
support its necessarily implied concomitant slur upon the abilities of this
former Chief Justice of the United States and his concurring colleagues.
No doubt if it had occurred to any of the present justices that the opinion
of the Court in Williamns v. North Carolina was open to such an interpretation he would have taken care to make it clear that the interpretation
would be erroneous. However, it is one of the unfortunate incidents of
the dubious dictum in the court's opinion that "Haddock v. Haddock is
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overruled" together with the context of that dictum that it lends color to
such an interpretation by an uncharitable critic.
Indeed I do not know of any lawyer, past or present, who would entertain or defend the professional views concerning these problems of divorce
jurisdiction under the Constitution of the United States which have been
attributed to Justice White and his concurring colleagues.
On the other hand'all lawyers and judges use legal fictions in their arguments. Legal fictions and similar metaphors are valuable implements of
jurisprudence which render traditional procedures available for new purposes of justice, which ease the path of progress for less agile and more
conservative minds, and which speed the persuasion of mechanical, phrase
bound logicians. Those lawyers who know the history. of the action of
assumpsit with its common counts, often alleging wholly fictitious promises,
who know the theories of "constructive" trusts, "constructive" frauds, and
"constructive" possession, where the evidence fails to establish the existence
of an actual trust, or deceit, or an actual physical occupation or control;
who know the operation of the idea of "estoppel" in all its various phases,
especially in suits over marital affairs, should find no serious technical difficulty with the 'New York theories of jurisdiction to divorce or with the
doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock.
Consider, for instance, the recent case of Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y.
355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940). The facts of the case and decision are
stated *by judge Finch in part as follows:
"This is an action for separation brought by a wife in which she seeks
support. The husband seeks to avoid liability to plaintiff by alleging the
invalidity of a Nevada divorce which he obtained from his first wife.
May he avail himself of such a d.efense?
"The answer interposes two separate and distinct defenses. It is only
the second defense with which we are concerned. ,
"The facts presented by the defense are as follows: Defendant and
his first wife domiciled in this State, were married here in 1905. There
are two children by that marriage. In 1932 the present defendant, while
retaining his residence in this State, made a visit to Reno, Nev., where
he invoked the jurisdiction of the courts of that State and obtained a
decree of divorcd from his first wife, who neither entered an appearance
nor was'personally served in that action, and who at all times has remained a resident of this State. Cf. Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296,
12 N. E. 2d 305. Consequently this divorce against the first wife is
not recognized by the courts of this State. Winston v. Winston, 165
N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126
N. E. 508; Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279. The
subsequent marriage between plaintiff and defendant, therefore, was
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void for the incapacity of the defendant to marry. But none the less
plaintiff and defendant participated in a complete marriage ceremony
and did live together as man and wife for six years pursuant thereto,
after which time defendant abandoned plaintiff, who now brings this
action. Defendant entered the defense already noted, ,viz., that he
lacked capacity to marry plaintiff because the court, which upon his
petition purported to accord him a divorce from his first wife, lacked
jurisdiction to act in the premises., Upon motion of plaintiff Special
Term struck out the defense as insufficieAt in law and cited Starbuck
v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193, 93 Am. St. Rep. 631, in
support of its decision. The Appellate Division affirmed by a divided
court, the majority citing Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y.
S. 877; affirmed 266 N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186, and the minority citing
Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. 2d 26, 109 A. L. R. 1016.
Defendant appeals upon the following question, certified by the Appellate Division to this court: 'Is the second, separate and distinct defense
in the amended 'answer, sufficient in law on the face thereof ?'
"The question upon this appeal, therefore, depends upon whether
defendant husband may now be heard to assert in this action, brought
by his second 'wife,' that the judgment of divorce "which he sought and
obtained failed of its purpose and thereby did not give to the defendant
that freedom to remarry which he appeared to possess by virtue of said
judgment.
"In general, a person who invokes the jurisdiction of a court will
not be heard to repudiate the judgment which that court entered upon
his seeking and in his favor. ....
"It is conceded that the estoppel which is invoked against the present
defendant is not a true estoppel as that term is ordinarily understood,
although the effect is the same in the case at bar.
"But it is urged that even though the prior authorities in this State
do not compel a contrary result, a different conclusion should be reached
as a matter of principle. It is said that public policy requires that the
interest of the State in the first marriage be protected even though that
may also give to the individual defendant an incidental advantage to
which he is not entitled in his private right. Thus defendant seeks to,
avoid the obligation which he has purported to undertake to support
his second wife, upon the pretext that such is inconsistent with his obligations toward his first wife. Objection upon this score is fully met
by the fact that the needs of the first wife are to be taken into account
in arriving at the ability of defendant to support plaintiff in the case
at bar. Defendant would altogether disavow any obligation toward this
plaintiff because of his obligation to his first wife. The result which
we reach here is the only one which awards justice to this plaintiff, prevents her from becoming a public charge if she should be impecunious
and at the same time protects the first wife in adequate degree. Thus
there is complete observance of not only the interest of the State in
the protection of the first marriage, but also of the other interest of the
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State that marriage obligations shall not be lightly undertaken and lightly
discarded.
"Nothing in this decision should be taken to mean that because the
defendant may not in these proceedings avail himself of the invalidity
of his Nevada decree he is not the husband of his first wife. On the
contrary, the very theory that defendant is precluded in these proceedings presupposes that the true situation is the' contrary of that which
he may show in the case at bar.
"It follows, therefore, that the order appealed from should be affirmed,
with costs, and the question certified answered in the negatives."
[See also Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 Sup. Ct. 551 (1901).]
If the opinion of the court in Williams v. North Carolina condemns in
toto the technic of Haddock v. Haddock (which I very much doubt is its
intent, but which will be its meaning to most lawyers) would the same
justices condemn (unofficially of course) the similar technic in Krause v.
Krause? What is the essential difference between the judicial technic of
Krause v. Krause and that of the courts in Haddock v. Haddock? Of course,
each case is part of one coherent pattern of New York jurisprudence.
[See also BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 113.4 et seq.; Haddock
v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 626, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 550 (1906) (dissenting
opinion of Justice Brown); People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879) ; footnotes
2, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 43 (last paragraph) to my 1936 article,
21 CORNELL L. Q. 394 et seq., 402-403, 405-416; and especially Turner v.
Turier, 44 Ala. 437 (1870) (abstracted in Justice White's opinion in
Haddock v. Haddock at 599, 26 Sup. Ct. at 539-540). Also see my discussion of Davis v. Davis, post.]
Why throw all this accumulated jurisprudence with its advantage to the
cause of justice incontinently out the window? Or does the Court's dictum
promise to do so? It is a tantalizing characteristic of this dictum that
no one can make more than a hopeful guess as to what it really means.
Before I give my guess at its purport, I wish to call attention briefly to a
few incidental points in the Court's opinion, for which respectable authority
doubtless could be cited, but which should be recognized easily as errors on
careful reconsideration. I repeat that I do this only because cumulative
judicial reiterations of such errors in this complicated field are precedents
dangerous to our professional technic.

(1) My previous comments and my 1936 article sufficiently cover such
statements in the Court's opinion as the following [317 U. S. at 293, 63
Sup. Ct. at 210 (1942)] : "But we do not agree with the theory of the Haddock case that, so far as the marital status of the parties is concerned, a
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decree of divorce granted under such circumstances by.one state need not
be given full faith and credit in another."
Of course my interpretation of the decision in Haddock v. Haddock is
that it did not refuse full faith and credit to the Connecticut adjudication and
decree and did not continue the "marital status" of the husband in any other
than a legal fictional sense. Certainly the New York suit in form was a
suit founded on a continuing marital relation between the parties, but in
purpose and substance it was a suit for alimony only, and therefore really
touched only the support obligation incident of the dissolved marriage. The
decree for, separation was of course wholly superfluous and, except as a
fictional procedural device, ridiculous. [See dissenting opinion of Justice
Brown in Haddock v. Haddock, 201- U. S. at 625-626, 26 Sup. Ct. at 550
(1906); also footnote 43 to my 1936 article, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 429-430.]
(2) It has not been the traditional view nor did the Supreme Court
hold in Williamson v. Osent on ° that "a married woman may acquire in
this country a domicil separate from her husband"-exc9 pt in a case where
she was justified legally in separating from her husband. [Footnote 9, 317
U. S. at 298, 63 Sup. Ct. at 224 (1942).] I have suggested, supra, that if
the Court now is enlarging the legal power of Mrs. Hendrix in this particular, it should have emphasized this novel development.
(3)
The proposition that federal lw compels a state against its legal
policies of social importance to give a larger measure of faith and credit
to judgments of sister states than to legislation or other "public acts" of
sister states because the Congress has specifically enjoined full faith and
credit as to judgments by the Judiciary Act, is untenable. I never have
been able to see that the Judiciary Act added to the jurisdictional effectiveness of the judgments of state courts in other states as to substance. Of
course, in the nature of judgments and the practical considerations which
make their recognition important, there are some peculiarities which do not
apply to legislation; but the fundamental problem as to full faith and credit
is the same-one of statesmanlike adjustment of the competing jurisdictions, judicial or legislative or administrative, of -the states inter se.11.
10232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442 (1914).
UlPerhaps it is necessary to warn some of my friends of the mechanical school of
jurisprudence that the opinion of the Court by its emphasis on the difference in the
effect of judgments as compared with the effect of legislation under the Full Faith and
Credit clause and the Judiciary Act, probably does not intend to imply that if defendants
instead of obtaining their Nevada decrees had obtained valid divorces by special legislation from one of the few states which still permit this [Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190,
8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888)] the decision of Williams v. North Carolina would have been
different.
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2
Fall v. Eastin,1
Olsted v. Olmsted,'3 and other cases cited by Justice
Douglas in the text of his opinion and his footnotes [317 U. S. at 294-295,
63 Sup. Ct. at 211-212 (1942)] as strange exceptions to his thesis are not
all as dubious as he implies; nor are the decisions cited in footnote 5 [at
294, 63 Sup. Ct, at 211] properly rested "on the doctrine that the state
where the land is located is 'sole mistress' of its rules of real property," as
should be clear to justice Douglas's research assistant through consideration of Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct. 152 (1917),
cited in footnote 7 [at 297, 63 Sup. Ct. at 212]. The principle of these
"exceptional" cases is applied also to property interests in chattels and
intangibles subject to the exclusive or overriding legal jurisdiction of th
state refusing to give effect to the foreign judgment.
As to Fauntleroyv. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 (1908), the wisdom of the decision in that case is doubtful and it is not impossible
that it may sometime be overruled or limited in effective scope as a precedent. The practical problem in that case was this. The argument in
favor of the Missouri judgment did not lie in any governmental interest
of Missouri. It consisted in the jurisprudential principles of economy
of use of the time of courts for litigation and justice to parties in fortifying
adjudications in their favor against the frustration of continual relitigation.
Opposing these sound traditional principles in Fauntleroy v. Lum, we Tind
arrayed the legal prohibition of Mississippi against that conduct of plaintiff
and defendant in Mississippi on which the cause of action was founded,
and the sanction of the Mississippi law prohibiting recovery on the invalidated transactions. Why should the governmental interest of the State of
Mississippi in discouraging the prohibited type of conduct in Mississippi
for reasons of social policy have been thwarted in this suit in the Mississippi
courts by the fact that plaintiff previously had recovered a judgment in
Missouri in a suit to which the State of Mississippi was not a party? This
was the motivation of the vigorous opinion (per White, J.) of the four
dissenting justices in Fauntleroy v. Lum and I have not been able to convince myself that it was sufficiently countered by the mechanical reasoning
of the majority opinion in spite of its closing suggestion that mistakes of
law such as that committed by the Missouri courts would be rare and that
generally other states wouldl cooperate through their courts with Mississippi
in enforcement of itg legitimate governmental policy. [Compare Buttron v.
El Paso Northeastern Ry. Co., 93 S. W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906);

12215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3 (1909).
13216 U. S.386, 30 Sup. Ct. 292 (1910).
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Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587
(1914); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (1912);
Atchison Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101, 44 Sup. Ct. 469 (1924);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589 (1935); and see also
my discussion of Davis v. Davis, post, and compare especially Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1903) ; Harding v. Harding, 198
U. S. 317, 25 Sup. Ct. 679 (1905); and Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59
Sup. Ct. 3 (1938).]
I proceed now to venture my guess as to the predictions implied in the
Court's dictum concerning Haddock v. Haddock.
1. I cannot believe that if and when the sort of question involved in
Haddock v. Haddock arises again in the Supreme Court (but with stronger
circumstances of fact in favor of the deserted wife) it will decide the case
contra to Haddock v. Haddock. Either such a decision would be a piece of
mechanical formalism unworthy of twentieth-century judges and deserving
of the scornful reforming frenzy of a Dickens against "the circumlocution
office" or it would be a prohibition against the traditional power of the
state of domicil of a deserted wife to protect her right of support from
utter destruction by the deserting husband's use of the legal machinery of a
foreign state without fair practical opportunity to the wife for defense.
[See footnote 23 to my 1936 article, 21 CORNELL L. Q. 407-413; BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 113.1.] Of course, if social developments
make obsolete the legal right of married women to support from their husbands, this argument of mine will die at its, root. Until then, however, I
infer that when the opinion of the Court limits the criticism of "the theory
of the Haddock case" to the purport of that theory "so far as the marital
status of the parties is concerned" there is no indication intended that New
York cannot protect the right to support of its deserted wives against
foreign divorces granted by states without personal jurisdiction over the
wives. In common sense, therefore, it should follow that New York can
still exercise such a protecting power through the mechanism of the legal
fiction of Haddock v. Haddock.
2. Property interests are excluded expressly from the scope of the
Court's unf6rtunate dictum. Therefore I shall not discuss them here-not
even certain unfair features of New York law which have been held
constitutional.
3. There is left, then, the effect of the Nevada divorces on the "status"
(i.e., marriage capacity and cohabitation rights) of the deserted North Carolina spouses. It seems to me that the Court's opinion sufficiently indicates
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that the Nevada divorce decrees must be given at least the same effect in
these particulars as though they were valid North Carolina decrees. I
heartily approve of this. Independently of my strong prejudice against
futile legal restrictions on natural human impulses, inspired by traditional
religious and social beliefs which now are held only by certain minority
groups with considerable political influence, I can advance a supporting technical argument. What is the justifying policy which North Carolina could
suggest for refusing in favor of the deserted North Carolina spouses (if it
chose to do so) the same restoration of marital capacity as a consequence
of the valid Nevada decrees which would have resulted from valid North
Carolina decrees? The only answer that I can think of is this. Traditionally
states at times have insisted on independent control of restoration of marital
capacity to their domiciliaries. In exercise of this traditional legal power
North Carolina then may insist on passing on the question of restoration
of marital capacity, even in this case, through the formalities of its own
governmental agencies. But is there any legitimate practical purpose which
could be served by this governmental formalism? I think that there is not.
Therefore it seems to me that there is no such North Carolina governmental
interest to be served as would justify excluding from the scope of the Full
Faith and Credit clause this particular consequence of the Nevada decrees.
As for the mutual obligations of cohabitation, unquestionably they are terminated by the Nevada decree. Any other decision would be absurd. [See
21 CORNELL L. Q. 417.]
But What of People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879)? I have paid my respects to People v. Baker and the sadistic New York social policy and law
reflected in that case, as well as to the similar intolerant, unfair, unprogressive policy of traditional English law on marital problems which
had a related social and religious background. [21 CORNELL L. Q.
402-407, especially footnotes.] People v. Baker, however, would be consistent with the Full Faith and Credit clause if the defendant could
have been convicted of bigamy under the New York law if the wife's
divorce had been granted by a New York court instead of the court of her
state of domicil, Ohio. [See dissenting opinion of Danforth, J., in O'Dea.
v. O'Dea, 101 N. Y. 23, 30, 4 N. E. 110, 112 commenting on People v.
Baker at 40 et seq., 4 N. E. at 118 et seq.] On the other hand if, as stated
in the opinion of People v.' Baker, the New York statutory penalty against
this divorcee at fault who remarried would have been less than that for
bigamy if the divorce had been granted by New York, the decision in People
v. Baker is subject to the technical objection that it denied to the Ohio

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29

decree an equivalent effect in this particular to that which would have resulted
from a valid New York decree in favor of the wife. [See as to the present
New York law, N. Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 6, 8; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 341;
N. Y. Civ. PiAc. ACT §§ 1175, 1176.]
But I should be quite satisfied if the Supreme Court freed deserted New
York spouses against whom valid 'foreign divorce decrees have been obtained
from the incapacities of their previous marriages regardless of New York
law and policy, for I fail to see any social advantage in denying marital
capacity to a divorcee. Technically the Court would have to rest such a
judgment, not on the Full Faith and Credit clause alone, but on the Fourteenth Amendment and thus invalidate all such unprofitable, sadistic legal
prohibitions wholesale; but this I fear outruns the march of time and I
cannot predict with assurance that the Court's dictum in Williams v. North
Carolina forecasts this much of legal revolution and, if it pleases you,
progress.
DAVIS v. DAVIS

My comment on the decision in Davis v. -Davis will be brief. I shall not
take space or time to state the facts of the case, but shall assume that you
have read it.
Davis v. Davis has been discussed extensively and great novelty has been
attributed to the decision. It has been interpreted variously, but in most
startling particulars, (1) as giving support to the proposals of the American
Law Institute concerning Haddock v. Haddock, [RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1934) § 113] and (2) as changing the rule which formerly permitted successful collateral attack on a decree of dissolution of marriage
where neither person was domiciled in the state although both parties were
subject personally to the jurisdiction of the court and the court found that
one or both of them was domiciled in the state.
On the first point it is sufficient to say that I cannot see the slightest
support for Section 113 of the Resiatement in the decision of the case or
in the Court's opinion, and that if any loyal brother of the Order of the
Law Institute can whittle such a peg out of it, he has my blessing to do so.
Of course, the facts of the case put it into a very different class than that
of Haddock v. Haddock because (a) both parties in Davis v. Davis were subject personally to the jurisdiction of the State of Virginia and its court at
the time of the divorce, and (b) the main contention of the wife in Davis
v. Davis was that the husband as well as the wife was not domiciled in
Virginia at the time of the divorce. If the husband was domiciled in Vir-
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ginia and the wife personally was subject to the court's jurisdiction, then
the decree clearly was effective and conclusive for all purposes as a complete
dissolution of the marriage under Cheerer v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S.

1869).
This carries us to point (2), supra. The Supreme Court in deciding that
the Virginia divorce decree and the incidental decision of the Virginia court
were conclusive and entitled to full faith and credit in the later litigation
over alimony in the courts of the District of Columbia, had every natural
impulse of common sense to decide against the wife. The wife's case on
the record, if the statement of facts in the report is a fair reflection of the
record, was weak. While technically the evidence offered by her to show
lack of domicile in Virginia was relevant and material, the impression remains that if it had been admitted it would not have been sufficient to
overcome the presumption raised by the findings in the Virginia trial.
While this fact is not pertinent technically to the announced ground of the
decision of the Supreme Court, it should be noted that it is a sort of collateral influence that not infrequently eases progress to a technical decision
that otherwise might be more difficult fo fabricate. Furthermore, the decision of the district court of appeals against the husband was based on the
idea that although he was domiciled in Virginia, the wife was not and was
not subject to the court's jurisdiction and that therefore under Haddock v.
Haddock the Virginia proceedings need not be given effect in the District
alimony suit. However, I believe that even'on the assumption that neither
party was ever domiciled in Virginia, the decision of the Supreme Court in
Davis v. Davis is sound unquestionably and is not revolutionary.
It is true that case precedents have been consistent for many years to the
effect that if the state of domicil of the parties will not give validity to a
decree of dissolution of marriage granted by another state, it cannot be
compelled to do so through application of the Full Faith and Credit clause
of the Federal Constitution although the state which granted the decree found
on evidence through- its court which had personal jurisdiction over both
spouses, that one or both of them were domiciled in the state. [See People v.
Dawell, 25 Mich. 247 (1872); State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878);
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1903).] These precedents have been interpreted by some members of the mechanical school of
jurisprudence to mean that the decree and adjudication were open to successful attack collaterally for all purposes. Yet we have plenty of evidence
to the contrary. [See inter alia Sinith v. Sinith, 43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 So.
248 (1891); Waldo v. Waldo, 52 Mich. 94, 17 N. W. 710 (1883); In re

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29

Ellis' Estate, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056 (1893); Starbuck v. Starbuck,
173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903) ; Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26
N. E. (2d) 290 (1940) ; Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317, 25 Sup. Ct.
679 (1905); and now Davis v. Davis. Compare Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 91 N. J. Eq. 261, l1q Atl. 19 (1920); Stevens vi. Stevens, 273 N. Y.
157, 7 N. E. (2d) 26 (1937).]
For the important distinction between a foreign decree of divorce (1)
as a state order dissolving the marital status, which historically needs no
judicial process for its constitutional validity, and (2) as a judicial decision
of litigation (res judicata) entailing collateral legal effects, see footnote 2
to my 1936 article. [21 CORNELL L. Q. 394-396.]
It must be acknowledged that the opinion of the Court in Davis v. Davis
is not as informative as might be desired, but if it is read in the light of its
careful recitation of facts and its distinguishing of Haddock vr. Haddock,
and its citation of authorities, and its omission of all evidence of awareness
that novel law is involved in the decision, there should be no difficulty in
appreciating its import. Davis v. Davis falls in the class of cases among
which I have included it, supra. Indeed H-arding v. Harding,198 U. S. 317,
25 Sup. Ct. 679 (1905), is cited by Justice Butler as a similar case to be
compared with Davis v. Davis. In Harding vr. Harding also the foreign
court had no full jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage because the state
was not the state of domicil of either party, although both parties had appeared in the suit and the foreign court had found that it was the state of
plaintiff's domicil. Nevertheless the Supreme Court held that under the
Full Faith and Credit clause this foreign adjudication of facts and right
as to marital fault was conclusive in the later marital suit in the state of
domicil. In Davis v. Davis as in Harding vi. Harding the foreign (Virginia)
adjudication was offered as conclusive in litigation concerning the economic
rights of support of the wife growing out of the marriage-a purely private
matter between the spouses. The litigation had nothing to do with the
public interest of the state of domi cil in determining continuance or dissolution of the marriage in its "status" aspects. Hence the citation by Justice
Butler of Andrews v. Aidrews,' 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1903), as
an authority apparently not disapproved, but to be compared and distinguished. [305 U. S. at 41-43, 59 Sup. Ct. at 7-8 (1938).]
4
In my opinion there is nothing novel in the decision of Davis vi. Davis.'
The doctrine of the opinion only echoes well known precedents and familiar
14 After all why jump to the conclusion that Justice Butler had developed revolttionary ideas?
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distinctions. To understand these precedents and distinctions it is necessary
to separate in thought the various different phases and incidents of the
marital bond which I catalogued in my 1936 article. [21 CORNELL L. Q.
413-421.]
The furor of ,professional excitement which Davis v. Davis and Willians
v. North Carolina have caused, seems to me further evidence of the deterioration in our professional technic and education to which I referred earlier
in this article. The main motive of these transient wayward remarks is a
desire to protest against continuance of this unpromising trend.

